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Abstract: Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic
welfare or national security of countries. The importance of critical
infrastructures necessitates state-level coordination of security efforts based on
some rigid policies, strategies, and procedures. This hierarchical set of rules is
collectively referred to as the critical infrastructure protection program (CIPP).
As the pioneer of CIPP, the USA has a very complex program in which
partners and stakeholders have multiple and varied interacting roles and
responsibilities. The complexity of roles and interactions creates a need to
make a representation of these complex structures by using intuitive tools. The
Zachman framework is such a tool that provides a formal and structured way of
viewing and defining a complex enterprise. It is represented by a 6×6 matrix
with rows defining stakeholders and columns defining underlying
interrogatives. In this article, a proof-of-concept study is performed to represent
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the US CIPP using the Zachman framework. The proof-of-concept study
showed that the Zachman framework could be beneficial in overcoming
challenges of a CIPP program which can be regarded as a complex enterprise.
Keywords: critical infrastructure protection program; CIPP; cyber security;
roles and responsibilities; stakeholders; enterprise architecture; Zachman
framework; system of systems.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Tatar, U., Karabacak, B.,
Katina, P.F. and Igonor, A. (2019) ‘A complex structure representation of the
US critical infrastructure protection program based on the Zachman
framework’, Int. J. System of Systems Engineering, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp.221–234.
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1

Introduction

Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic welfare or national
security of countries. Energy, telecommunications, finance, security services, health
systems, transportation, and water management are prominent examples of critical sectors
which include many critical infrastructures.
The utilisation of cyber systems to monitor and control critical infrastructures
efficiently and cost-effectively have been increasing with every passing day. For
example, modern and connected information technologies are used in controlling energy
and water management systems in contrary to isolated legacy systems of the past. Smart
grids, smart transportation systems, and remotely controllable local gas distribution
systems have been emerging as vital parts of modern society. Some critical
infrastructures are entirely dependent on conventional cyber systems. For instance,
today’s banking and finance infrastructure substantially depends on information
technologies. Telecommunication infrastructure is wholly composed of cyber systems.
Because of new service models like cloud computing, the internet can be regarded as
critical infrastructure (Beltran and Fontenay, 2005). The 2007 attack on Estonia networks
demonstrated how much the well-being of a country depends on internet infrastructure
(Kozlowski, 2014; Tatar et al., 2014).
Critical infrastructures must be protected in conformity with some specific policies
because of the attack potential of these threats especially today’s cyber threats. That is
why most of the developed countries have national critical infrastructure protection
programs (CIPP). CIPP is a national and coordinated effort created to protect critical
infrastructures from both cyber and physical threats (Dunn and Wigert, 2004). A typical
CIPP includes all responsible and related stakeholders from critical infrastructure
operators, government (federal and local), the private sector, academia, and non-profit
organisations.
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When one examines the CIPP of several countries, it can be seen that there are some
critical challenges almost every CIPP encounters. Firstly, the vast number of stakeholders
is a common challenge for CIPPs. Critical infrastructure protection is not only the result
of the contributions of all stakeholders but also the interactions of them; these
stakeholders have to cooperate to achieve their goals. The multitude of stakeholders and
the vast amount of stakeholder actions are the basis of the complex relationships and
interdependencies among critical infrastructures (Idaho National Laboratory, 2006).
Another challenge is the high ratio of the private sector ownership of critical
infrastructures. Market-oriented settings make government intervention and regulatory
actions challenging to employ (Karabacak et al., 2016).
Rinaldi et al. (2001) appraise multiple infrastructures as a system of systems. In
another article, Rinaldi (2004) asserts that “understanding the operational characteristics
of and providing a sufficient level of security for these infrastructures requires a
system-of-systems perspective, given their interdependencies”. According to Walters
et al. (2014), “complex systems are characterized by many autonomous and diverse,
interrelated components, tightly coupled through many interconnections”. They discuss
the implications of the integration of system of systems engineering and enterprise
architecture. Authors point out the contribution of the integration as the enhanced
governance of complex systems. Carter et al. (2016) also discuss enterprise architecture
view of complex system governance. They discuss the increasing complexity of the
system of systems contexts and explore the governance architecture concept. According
to the DoD Guide for Systems Engineering of Systems of Systems, “a system of systems
is a collection of systems, each capable of independent operation, that interoperate
together to achieve additional desired capabilities” (Department of Defense, 2008). All
critical infrastructures in every sector in a country can be regarded as an enormous
system of systems. Because each critical infrastructure is capable of independent
operation and those infrastructures interoperate together to achieve a prosperous nation.
Therefore, a CIPP can be regarded as one of the essential means to manage the system of
systems of critical infrastructures. Authors reviewed and summarised the articles that
formulate the system of systems approach for interdependent critical infrastructures in the
literature review section.
At this point, the Zachman framework – as a fundamental structure for enterprise
architecture – can be used to represent the CIPP of a country in an insightful way. First of
all, an enterprise is a collection of organisations or business units that share a common set
of goals. CIPP can intuitively be regarded as an enterprise with many stakeholders with
the goal of securing infrastructures and the country as a whole. The CIPP of the USA is a
very complex and dynamic enterprise. Because it is complex and changing, it needs to be
written formally. Architecture is a formal way of describing a system and guiding its
implementation and also the key to dealing with change and complexity (Zachman,
2003). The Zachman framework is a comprehensive and well-defined matrix tool for
Enterprise Architecture. The Zachman framework can also be defined as “a fundamental
structure for Enterprise Architecture which provides a formal and structured way of
viewing and defining an enterprise” (Sowa and Zachman, 1992). It is a 6×6 matrix with
rows representing different points of view of an enterprise and the columns representing
underlying interrogatives. Romero and Vernadat point out the shift from traditional
enterprise architecture to digital architecture, namely next-generation enterprise
architecture, which includes the latest digital technologies (Romero and Vernadat, 2016).
In the next-generation enterprise architecture, cross-business processes can be quickly
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modified, and these changes should not be regarded as exceptions, but normality.
Zachman framework can be used to handle the rapid changes in enterprises.
In this paper, a proof of concept study has been made with the participation of
practitioners in which the US CIPP has been represented partly using the Zachman
framework. The purpose of the study is not to represent the whole CIPP of the USA using
the Zachman framework, as this can be a topic of a more comprehensive case study.
Instead, the purpose of the study is to show the suitability of the Zachman framework for
the representation of complex enterprise architectures like CIPP and the development of a
proof-of-concept study.
Section 2 is dedicated to a literature review in which academic studies that embrace a
combined study of the Zachman framework and information security are summarised.
Section 3 delineates challenges associated with the protection of critical infrastructures.
In Section 4, both the problem statement and the motivation for this study are shared with
the reader. The detailed information about the matrix, the description of its rows,
columns, and the rules of formation are given in the Section 5. Section 6 shows a
proof-of-concept representation of the US CIPP based on the Zachman framework.
Section 7 is dedicated to discussions and conclusions.

2

Literature review

Various studies propose the use of an enterprise architecture framework for modelling
security features of an enterprise. In this section, seven academic studies that propose the
use of the Zachman framework or enterprise architecture in the information security area
are reviewed. The purpose of the studies changes from ensuring better coordination
within the enterprise to increasing efficiency.
Pulkkinen et al. (2007) use enterprise architecture as a means of “comprehensive and
coordinated planning and management of corporate ICT and security infrastructure”. This
study uses enterprise architecture to plan security architecture in which technological
solutions are developed according to business goals. The authors performed a case study
in a real organisation. The security-related decisions are mapped into a 12-cell matrix so
that an enterprise architecture context is created. The rows of the matrix show enterprise,
domain and systems levels of the organisation in the case study – columns of the matrix
show business, information, applications and technology architectures.
Ertaul and Sudarsanam (2005) show how the Zachman framework can be used in
defining, designing and creating tools for effectively securing an enterprise. The authors
fill out the 6×6 matrix to create a generic model that shows the generalised plan for a
secured enterprise. The authors use a new column named ‘external requirements and
constraints’ in place of the ‘motivation/why’ column that is present in the original version
of the Zachman framework.
Rosa uses the Zachman framework to evaluate the readiness of an IT infrastructure of
a real organisation (Rosa, 2008). The author audits the organisation and proposes
recommendations, firstly. Secondly, the author places the recommendations to the matrix
of the Zachman framework, so that coverage of the recommendations can be seen in the
perspective of the Zachman framework. Eleven out of 36 cells of the matrix are filled by
the recommendations. The first column (what) and fifth row (sub-contractor view) all
have empty cells. According to the author, the representation of recommendations with
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the Zachman framework is useful and sufficient in determining countermeasures of
business continuity.
Feltus et al. (2014) propose an architecture for SCADA information systems that are
used to control and monitor critical infrastructures. The authors use ArchiMate enterprise
architecture model to model “SCADA components to enrich SCADA component
collaborations and the description of their behavior in the cyber policy”. The authors
posit that current enterprise architecture models such as TOGAF, ArchiMate, and
Zachman framework consider only human actors at the business level. They claim that
beyond human actors, software autonomous entities have to be taken into consideration
for the distribution of security policies because of the rising security requirements for the
management of heterogeneous and distributed architecture. It is also posited that
intelligent software items manage complex systems.
Oda et al. (2009) review three enterprise information security architecture
frameworks by taking security integration features into account. The reviewed
frameworks are the Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA), Gartner
EISA framework, and Zachman framework (Oda et al., 2009). These authors emphasise
that ‘information security architecture’ is a subset of enterprise architecture which is
focused on aligning information security with business strategy. They provide some
information on architecture frameworks saying that SABSA focused on business to
security and based on the Zachman framework. EISA provides details on how security is
incorporated into the enterprise architecture. In this regard, the Zachman framework is
generic compared to the SABSA and EISA. However, it can be used for security
architecture modelling. The authors extract the common and different features of the
frameworks. Because of the space constraints, it is suggested to refer to the article for
further details. The authors also compare the enterprise architecture of Oakland
University with the reviewed frameworks and develop some suggestions for the
university.
Ekstedt and Sommestad (2009) claim that current architectural languages are not
sufficient for security analyses. These authors present three reasons for insufficient
support of architectural frameworks for security analyses. Firstly, they lack enough
details to provide the information required for the analyses. Secondly, they do not
propose attributes systematically. Thirdly, many frameworks do not contain classes to
model control systems. In their paper, authors combine security theory and architecture
models and propose abstract models that are built from attack and defence tree.
Urbaczewski and Mrdalj (2006) compare five enterprise architecture frameworks in
terms of views/perspective, abstractions, and system development lifecycle phases. The
paper is one of the most comprehensive and detailed comparisons of the enterprise
architecture frameworks in the literature. The authors conclude that the Zachman
framework is the most comprehensive framework as it uses many viewpoints related to
different aspects whereas other frameworks represent a small number of viewpoints and
aspects.
Two authors of the article proposed a roles and responsibilities matrix that was aimed
at improving national cybersecurity governance (Tatar et al., 2016). In this study, authors
created 6 × 3 matrices in which the roles and responsibilities are determined by taking
incident timeline (e.g., before, during and after a cyber incident) and critical actions (e.g.,
detection and response) into account. Although the proposed matrix is not within the
scope of enterprise architecture, it can be considered as a demonstration of an enterprise
by taking certain constraints into account.
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It can be seen that the Zachman framework has been applied successfully for the
security modelling of the enterprise. The enterprises that are considered in the reviewed
studies are standalone organisations. No study attempts to model a complex enterprise
that is composed of many different types of organisations like CIPP. This study will be
the first study of its kind.
Authors also reviewed the articles that use the system of systems approach to analyse
critical infrastructure, and to improve the resiliency of the infrastructures (Eusgeld et al.,
2011; Kröger, 2008; Little, 2003; Thacker et al., 2017; Tolone et al., 2009). All of these
studies focus on the interdependencies of critical infrastructures. Authors of these articles
consider interdependent critical infrastructures as examples of a system of systems and
propose models to analyse cascading failures or prevent the propagation of the failures
among critical infrastructures. All of the articles also concentrate on the technical aspects
of critical infrastructures. As an example, Eusgeld et al. (2011) model the
interdependencies between supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
among different infrastructures and experiment the failure propagation due to the single
or multiple failures in SCADA systems. Among those articles, Kröger (2008) emphasises
the societal and institutional aspects of the critical infrastructures in addition to
system-related, technological, and natural aspects. At this point, it is worth mentioning a
software called Athena. The development is sponsored by Air Force Research Laboratory
and funded by DARPA and USSTRATCOM later on. Athena is an analysis and
modelling software that is designed to actors, concepts and physical entities as a system
of systems. Athena has the capability of “merging various political, military, economic,
social, information, and infrastructure models and their associated cross dependencies”
(Idaho National Laboratory, 2006). It is used in the assessment of global failures such as
hurricane impact analysis and natural disaster planning exercises. Although the academic
studies that combine the concepts of the system of systems approach and critical
infrastructures mainly focus on the technical aspects of the critical infrastructures, similar
models can be devised at the organisational level. The proposed Zachman framework in
this article can be used as a basis for the studies that aim to model the organisational-level
relationships and interdependencies of the critical infrastructures.

3

Challenges of the critical infrastructure protection programs

The concept of critical infrastructure protection is an evolving and broad topic. The
dynamic nature of cyber threats and the proliferation of the information technologies
among all of the sectors from agriculture to communication contribute to both the
evolution of the CIPP over the years and to the broadness of the topic. This evolution and
broadness pave the way of the challenges inherent in the CIPPs of these countries. When
the CIPP of the USA is taken into account, the following prominent challenges can be
listed.
In the USA, critical infrastructures are mostly operated by the private sector
(de Bruijne and van Eeten, 2007). The focus of the private sector in using cyber systems
is mostly to ensure efficient and cost-effective management of critical infrastructures.
Because critical infrastructure protection is a subset of national security (Klimburg,
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2012), it is important to say that, the security of the private sector is closely related to
national security in the digital era (Andress, 2003). Therefore, other constraints like
security and resiliency apart from the constraints like efficiency and cost should be taken
into account in controlling and monitoring the infrastructures. This situation causes
tension between private sector and government. While government officials urge the
regulations as an essential gadget for critical infrastructure protection, private sector
asserts the regulations as the obstacles before the innovations (Karabacak et al., 2016),
(Orlowski, 2001). As an example, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 failed to pass the US
Senate as the result of this tension, although White House endorsed it (Kelly, 2012).
Secondly, one of the main characteristics of the CIPPs of the countries is the
existence of many stakeholders that have to cooperate to achieve the goals. The reality of
the multitude of stakeholders also applies to the USA. Some factors result in the
existence of a vast number of stakeholders. First of all, cybersecurity has many
dimensions including fighting against cybercrime, cyber military, cyber diplomacy, and
cyber intelligence (Klimburg, 2012) – the presence of these dimensions necessities the
cooperation of the government actors related with these dimensions. Secondly, critical
infrastructures are mostly operated by the private sector as said in the first paragraph.
Therefore, the private sector has to be one of the most important stakeholders. Thirdly,
developed countries have been establishing new government agencies for the protection
of critical infrastructures. For example, the Department of Homeland Security of the USA
was established after the 9/11 attacks. These new organisations introduce new
stakeholders as well. Finally, the technical aspects of cybersecurity introduce new
stakeholders to the CIPP. For example, activities like research and development and
capacity building are very vital aspects of the CIPPs. The multitude of stakeholders is
also the basis of the complex relationships and interdependencies among stakeholders.
Critical infrastructure protection is not only the result of the contributions of all
stakeholders but also the interactions of them. The isolated efforts of the stakeholders will
not be useful no matter how excellent these efforts are. At this point, the problems with
information sharing and cooperation among critical sectors and critical infrastructures
come as a challenge. Building a partnership between the private sector and government is
a challenge as well. That is why the key theme of the national infrastructure protection
plan (NIPP) is building a partnership. NIPP is the central document of the current CIPP
of the USA (Department of Homeland Security, 2013). NIPP contains the complete list of
the stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities. It also contains the collaboration and
cooperation requirements to achieve secure and resilient infrastructures.
As an example, there are sixteen critical sectors in the USA (The White House,
2013). There are thousands of critical infrastructures under these sectors. These
infrastructures have different size, cultures, geographic locations, objectives. Therefore,
these infrastructures have different views and practices for protection from cyber threats.
Therefore, it is not easy to unite these organisations under a single CIPP (Klimburg,
2012; Canada, 2009). Because there are many stakeholders, associated roles and
responsibilities and also interdependencies among both infrastructures and those
stakeholders, it is difficult to comprehend the critical infrastructure protection efforts of
the USA fully.
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Problem statement and motivation

When the CIPP programs of the countries are examined, it is seen that there are many
documents from a policy level to a tactical level. These documents include many
stakeholders written in a flat (non-hierarchical) way and a vast number of interdependent
roles and responsibilities. There is a need for an enterprise-level modelling tool to
represent a CIPP. Authors claim that the Zachman framework can be used to represent
CIPP of a country comprehensively. The use of the Zachman framework can also help in
overcoming the challenges mentioned above. Because the rows of the Zachman
framework make clear distinctions for owner, designer and implementers. It also helps to
determine the scope of the enterprise. Zachman framework also helps in analysing a
specific perspective in terms of six interrogatives. Therefore, almost every aspect of a
perspective is analysed.
Secondly, it is essential to state that the results of the literature review have shown
that the Zachman framework can be applied to the complex enterprises that deal with
cybersecurity cases. This paper goes a step further. Authors represent the national CIPP
of the USA by using the Zachman framework. The program of the USA has many
participants including different federal and state-level organisations, private sectors,
non-profit organisations, and academia. Consequently, this paper is the first attempt of
the representation of a complex enterprise that is composed of many different
organisations using the Zachman framework.

5

Basics of Zachman framework

The originator of the Zachman framework is John H. Zachman, who is the early pioneer
of the enterprise architecture concept (Zachman, 2009). Enterprise architecture is a
discipline in which the representation of the enterprise is performed for the successful
development and execution of strategy (The Federation of Enterprise Architecture
Professional Organizations, 2013; Gartner IT Glossary, 2016).
Zachman framework is a two-dimensional classification schema that reflects the
intersection between two traditional classifications. Columns of the matrix are
six interrogatives, which include the what, how, where, who, when, and why. The first
column is a material description. It is all about the things that form the structure. The
second column is a functional description. It is about the transformation and the
processes. The third column is the spatial description. It is all about flow and the
locations. The fourth column is the operational description. It is about operations and the
people/organisations performing those operations. The fifth column is the timing
description. It is about dynamics and events. The sixth column is the motivation
description. It is about motivation and strategies.
Each row in the matrix represents a holistic and unique view of the enterprise from a
particular perspective. The first row reflects an executive perspective; otherwise the
planner’s view. It is all about contextual scope. The second row represents the business
management perspective. It is the owner’s view. It is all about a conceptual business
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model. The third row reflects the architect perspective. It is the designer’s view. It is all
about logical system model. The fourth row reflects the engineering perspective. It is the
builder’s view. It is all about physical technology model. The fifth row reflects technician
perspective. It is the subcontractor’s view. It is also called the out-of-context perspective.
The sixth row reflects functioning enterprise, the result of the architectural process. It is
not architecture, but it completes the architectural picture (Zachman, 2003). Second, third
and fourth rows are called principal rows. First and fifth rows can be named as additional
perspectives. The sixth row is a physical manifestation of the enterprise, not a
representation (Zachman, 2003).
There are seven strict rules when filling out a matrix for an enterprise. Firstly, new
columns should not be added to the matrix. The only flexible thing with columns and
rows is the sequence of the columns. Columns can be interchangeable. Secondly, each
column has a simple generic model. It means that each column describes a single
independent variable for an enterprise. Thirdly, each cell model specialises in its
column’s generic model. It implies that the level of detail is a function of a cell, not a
column. Fourthly, each shell should be unique. Fifthly, diagonal relationships should not
be created between cells. Every cell is related to every other cell in a row. Every cell is
related to the cell above and below in a column. Sixthly, the names of the rows and
columns should not be changed. Finally, the logic of the framework is generic and
recursive.

6

Proof of concept representation of CIPP with Zachman framework

Table 1 shows a proof-of-concept representation of the CIPP of the USA in the 6×6
matrix of the Zachman framework. The aim of the representation is not to show every
aspect of the CIPP in a matrix. Instead, the Zachman framework provided an overview of
the CIPP concisely. Before preparing the matrix, the federal documents of the USA
regarding CIPP are reviewed. Among these documents, National Cyber Incident
Response Plan, PPD-21 and NIPP were the most useful documents, because these
documents are comprehensive, that is, that they contain most of the stakeholders and
associated roles and responsibilities (Department of Homeland Security, 2013, 2016; The
White House, 2013). for business management, architect, and engineer perspectives,
extra rows are created for each organisation added to the perspective to represent the
interrogatives of the organisations separately.
The CIPP program of the USA has many stakeholders with critical roles and
responsibilities. The Zachman framework provided the opportunity of distinguishing
different layers of roles and responsibilities. One may not realise the different layers of
responsibilities when s/he reads the NIPP and eventually may get confused with many
roles and responsibilities. With the help of the Zachman framework representation, not
only primary layers came in view but also one can see which of the stakeholders are
clustered in certain levels. Another advantage of the matrix is that it shows the
fundamental interdependencies of the CIPP. In order to see the dependencies, one can
examine the second column. In this column, there are sentences on how specific tasks are
succeeded through the help of collaboration and cooperation.

All of the efforts from the
policy level to the tactical
level

Enterprise
Perspective

By managing both the threat and asset
responses

Offensive measures

By fulfilling the requirements of the
policies, procedures, and guidelines

By following the guidelines,
procedures, standards set by NIST and
statues

US Military and
Department of
Defense

By supporting law enforcement,
counterintelligence, information
assurance, network defence, and critical
infrastructure protection communities

Training, threat analysis,
digital forensics

Security hardenings
FISMA, HIPAA, GLBA,
NERC requirements
(compliance)

Federal government

The federal government provides
information about risk environment

Securely control and
monitor critical
infrastructures

All levels of critical
infrastructures

SCADA, computers,
servers, databases

Critical
infrastructures,
SCADA systems, ISC
systems

Federal government
systems

By partnering 20 agencies from across
law enforcement, the intelligence
community, and the Department of
Defense/by collaborating international
and private sector partners

Coordination,
collaboration, partnership

Technician
perspective

Engineer
perspective

Federal government
systems

By coordinating overall federal effort

Coordination,
collaboration, partnership

Risk management

Critical sector(s).

By obeying Presidential Policy
Directive – 21 and Executive Order
13636

Where
Both in cyberspace
and physical world

How
By using statues, executive orders,
presidential directives

Who

All of the related
departments, centres,
institutes, groups

Technical staff
working for critical
infrastructure operators

US Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM)
Joint Operations
Center (JOC)

Department of Defense
Cyber Crime Center
(DC3)

Critical infrastructure
owners and operators

National Cyber
Investigative Joint
Task Force (NCIJTF) –
Hosted by FBI

National Cybersecurity
and Communications
Integration Center
(NCCIC)

NIST

Sector-specific
agencies

Department of
Homeland Security

When

Before, during and
after cyber incidents

Throughout all
lifecycle of the
infrastructure

During incidents

During the national
cyber incident
response

Throughout all
lifecycle of the
infrastructure

During the cyber
terrorism, espionage,
financial fraud, and
identity theft
incidents

During incident
response

Day-to-day federal
interface

Before, during and
after cyber incidents

Why

For the resilient critical
infrastructures that will
contribute to the prosperity
of the USA

To make sure that all of
proc

For deterrence

To support federal agency
mission partners by
providing analytical and
technical capabilities

To prevent and detect
cyber threats, to make Cis
resilient

To coordinate the Federal
Government’s threat
response

To coordinate the Federal
Government’s asset
response

For a natural unity of
effort
To implement its
knowledge and specialised
expertise about its sector

For the prosperity of the
USA

Table 1

Architect
perspective

Strategic guidance audit

Business
management
perspective

What

Maintain and update critical
infrastructure protection
program and NIPP

Executive
perspective
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Discussion and conclusions

This paper is the first attempt to use Enterprise Architecture for a nationwide complex
enterprise, composed of many organisations of varying types and sizes. Because the CIPP
of the USA is an extremely complex environment, the Zachman framework is used to
conceptualise the enterprise rather than making a shadow copy. The resulting matrix was
shared with two experts who were familiar with the CIPP of the USA. Both experts
emphasised that Zachman’s matrix is useful in demonstrating the change of the key
actors with changing levels. Experts also appreciated bringing the different levels of the
CIPP into the light. Therefore, the first results of the application show that the Zachman
framework may be helpful for not only novice experts but also experienced ones.
As the second step of the research, the developed Zachman matrix will be elaborated
on. The focus of the elaboration is to see as many responsibilities assigned in a single
matrix. The matrix described in this paper can be named as a version-one matrix that
gives the overview. Version-two matrix will contain more particular and actual role and
responsibilities. As the second step of the future research, for each key stakeholder, a
separate Zachman matrix will be created. Therefore, apart from seeing the whole CIPP
program in a single matrix, the points of view of individual key stakeholders will be
analysed by the help of separate matrices.
As another future study, authors also consider modelling the multi-organisational
structure of CIPP of the USA by using the system of systems approach (Keating et al.,
2003; Keating and Katina, 2011). The elaborated Zachman matrix can be utilised as the
beginning step of this future study.
The abstractions used in creating the matrix can be regarded as a shortcoming of the
representation of CIPP by using the Zachman framework. Although none of the
stakeholders are excluded from the matrix, many specific roles and responsibilities are
kept out, for the sake of clarity and in order not to lose the high-level point of view.
Nevertheless, it is essential to represent the CIPP by using the Zachman framework to
have a general view. It is also important to state that this study is the first study of its
kind.
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